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Strategic Behavior across Gender: 
A Comparison of Female and Male Expert Chess Players
* 
 
This paper aims to measure differences in risk behavior among expert chess players. The 
study employs a panel data set on international chess with 1.4 million games recorded over a 
period of 11 years. The structure of the data set allows us to use individual fixed-effect 
estimations to control for aspects such as innate ability as well as other characteristics of the 
players. Most notably, the data contains an objective measure of individual playing strength, 
the so-called Elo rating. In line with previous research, we find that women are more risk-
averse than men. A novel finding is that males choose more aggressive strategies when 
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In a number of areas the underrepresentation of women is a striking reality. This applies 
to top positions in politics, public and government administration, the academic professions, 
and not least corporate management. Such diverse outcomes have been observed even in 
markedly equality-aware societies such as the Swedish; see Albrecht et al. (2003), Booth 
(2007), Jonung and Ståhlberg (2008), and references therein. As noted by Booth (2007), 
economists have only recently tried to amend the standard human-capital model that seeks to 
explain gender differences in incomes and promotion by taking into account aspects such as 
culture, bargaining skills and tastes or preferences.
1 If it is the case that men, on average, are 
more competitive and less risk-averse than women, this might in part explain why promotion 
to higher positions has been advantageous for male candidates. Indeed, a number of studies 
provide evidence of systematic gender differences in terms of risk behavior and 
competitiveness. One issue still open for debate is whether these are innate differences or not, 
i.e. whether observed differences across gender in terms of risk taking and competitiveness 
are biologically or socially determined.
2  
                                                 
1 For example, Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001), point at the importance of non-cognitive 
skills as determinants for earnings. See also Bas ter Weel (2008) on the importance of non-
cognitive skills for predicting labor market outcomes. 
2 On the importance of the position of women in society for competitive behavior see Gneezy 
et al (2009). In a field study of the Khasi tribe in India and the Maasai tribe in Tanzania, they 
found that in a society organized along matrilineal lines, like the Khasi tribe, women chose 
competitive schemes more often than the men in their tribe. The authors take their result as 
evidence of the impact of social learning on behavior, but they also point at the fact that 
cultural choice may alter genetic evolution through various selection mechanisms. 
  2Our aim in this paper is threefold: First, we examine whether there are general gender 
differences in risk behavior. Second, as chess is a game between two players, it is possible to 
analyze the interactive risk behavior of a man playing against a woman compared to when he 
plays against a man and vice versa. This aspect relates to research on the importance of the 
composition of a group, i.e. whether individuals act differently in single-sex or mixed groups; 
see Gneezy et al. (2003) and Booth (2009) for a discussion on possible explanations for 
various outcomes found in the literature. Third, we investigate whether the behavior we have 
studied is rational or not in terms of winning probabilities.  
The study relates to recent studies that have tried to test the supposition of differences 
across gender with respect to risk taking and competitiveness.
3 Much of the literature has 
focused on experimental evidence, for example by looking at children or students competing 
under controlled conditions. Our study adds to that literature by providing evidence from a 
non-experimental setting, using comprehensive records of games played by a great number of 
top-level chess players. There are few other studies that have focused on differences in risk 
behavior and competitiveness outside the laboratory environment. For example, Bajtelsmit 
and Barnasek (1996) look at real world investment decisions for non-professional investors, 
while Olsen and Cox (2001) look at professional female and male investors. As stressed in 
Bajtelsmit and Barnasek (1996), differences across gender in financial placement strategies 
might be caused by the fact that the access to information varies in quality, where men might 
systematically receive “better” advice/information than their female counterparts. This could 
                                                 
3 See Booth (2009) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey and references on the issue of 
differences in risk preferences and competitiveness across gender in experimental studies. A 
related aspect addressed in the literature on gender differences regards overconfidence; see e.g. 
Bengtsson et al. (2005), Datta Gupta et al. (2005), and Nekby et al. (2008). Sometimes the 
three concepts are used interchangeably, indicating that they overlap to a certain extent. 
  3be due to male networks, but also to discriminatory treatment. None of these studies addresses 
the importance of mixed-sex competition. 
 As has been noted by several scholars within the field of cognitive sciences, there is a 
common set of skills appropriate for people working in advanced areas of the business world 
and academia, as well as for top-level chess. This holds not least because successes in these 
areas are associated with intelligence and expertise (see Bilalić et al. 2007, p. 460), as will be 
discussed in more detail below. Moreover, since chess is a game between two players, it 
definitely constitutes a (highly) competitive setting, thereby reflecting the nature of what is 
the daily routine for many actors in the corporate world and the field of government, as well 
as in academia. Becoming an expert chess player is by no means an easy task. Those who 
attain the higher ranks are certainly more competitive than people in general. This may apply 
to a greater extent to female players, i.e. they are presumably more competitive than women 
in general. The latter supposition is based on experimental evidence showing that women are 
less prone to choose tournaments than men (see e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Thus, in 
our study we look at preferences for risk across gender for a selected group of competitive 
people. Our results point at significant differences in risk taking across gender. Most notably, 
both men and women seem to change strategy when they face a female opponent. 
In section 2 we argue why research on chess data is a suitable complement to earlier 
research on (non-)cognitive differences across gender. Section 3 provides a short theoretical 
background to our estimation approach, while section 4 presents the data. In section 5 we 
present and discuss the results of our estimations, while section 6 concludes the study. 
  42. Why study chess?
 
This section aims to emphasize that findings based on chess can be transferred to other 
professions that are characterized by a high level of expertise. It thereby highlights the 
importance of having an accurate measure of a person’s skill level, the so-called Elo rating. 
For a number of years, strategic aspects involved in playing the game of chess have 
become an established analytical tool in cognitive psychology. In his review of the literature, 
Roring (2008) describes what makes chess a constructive method for the analysis of different 
aspects of human behavior: “Finding the best move in a chess position is a highly complex, 
real-world human activity, and each chess position represents a well-defined problem 
environment, with a fixed number of identifiable moves that can be played at any given point 
– perfect for studying search processes and problem solving” (p. 1).  
A landmark for establishing chess as an analytical tool was the introduction of the Elo 
rating that made it possible to compare the strength of chess players on a metric scale. Named 
after its inventor, Arpad Elo, it has become the benchmark classification in chess. 
[It] provides chess researchers with a valid measurement device unrivalled in other areas of 
expertise research. It is a true gold standard in individual-difference research. /…/ Other 
frequently investigated areas such as physics expertise /…/ do not permit such fine 
differentiation (Charness 1992, p. 6).  
 
Thus, with reference to Elo (1978), it has become possible to measure skills on 
objective grounds, i.e. there are no “subjective assessments” (Chabris and Glickman 2006, p. 
1040).
4 Also, as argued by different scholars in the field, e.g. Gobet (2005), Ross (2006) or 
                                                 
4 The Elo rating system is calculated using an algorithm based on the assumption of a normal 
distribution of playing strength across chess players. See the Appendix for a detailed 
description on how Elo points are estimated. 
  5Roring (2008), chess is well-suited to address questions concerning cognitive and 
psychological processes, thus extending its relevance to various fields of research studying 
human behavior. For example, one result obtained from chess research is that it takes about 
ten years of intense learning and hard work to become an expert, a time frame that also fits 
with “arts, sports, science, and the professions” (Gobet 2005, p. 185).
5  
Anecdotal evidence maintains that there is a positive correlation between skills in chess 
and intellectual capacity. Indeed, some research points at the legitimacy of such views; see for 
example Frydman and Lynn (1992). Other studies that have looked at the correlation between 
chess rating and intellectual capability have not provided support for this supposition; see 
Waters et al. (2002). As they argue, conflicting conclusions might be due to the fact that the 
groups that are scrutinized differ to some extent with respect to their demographic 
composition. In particular, Frydman and Lynn (1992) study children, while Waters et al. 
(2002) look at adult chess players. As argued by Waters et al. (2002), the importance of innate 
intellectual capacity will fade as children mature and learn to compensate for their weaknesses 
through purposeful training, resulting in approved chess skills and higher Elo ratings. One 
influential paper in the field of cognitive research arguing along these lines is Ericsson et al. 
(1993). It proposes the concept of “deliberate practice,” which denotes a person’s 
commitment to persistently exercise laborious tasks. The authors see such a trait as a vital 
                                                 
5 There are only few studies in economic literature that study chess players. In Ariga et al. 
(2008), a player’s Elo rating is studied as a signal for talent and as advice to invest in 
becoming a (professional) chess player. Another study, by Moel and Nye (2009), looks at 
(illegitimate) cooperation among expert players. A third study is by Levitt et al. (2009), who 
let top-level chess players solve different games designed for testing their backward induction 
skills. Their study responds to Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), who use a similar 
experimental setup.     
  6ingredient in attaining extraordinary (chess) skills. Thus, in their view, it is the capacity to 
direct one’s attention to monotonous, repetitive tasks over a long period of time, which is 
decisive for the attainment of specialist knowledge, rather than innate aptitude. Recent studies 
suggest that advanced chess skills are the result of innate personal characteristics, as well as 
persistent practicing, see Gobet and Campitelli (2007) and Grabner et al. (2007). 
In the world of chess, information on strategic concerns is accessible to everyone, 
especially since the Internet has become commonplace in daily life. Moreover, the signal of a 
player’s strength, i.e. the Elo rating, is of a similar quality irrespective of gender. In other 
words any incentive to invest in chess skills will not be distorted by one’s expectations of 
becoming a victim of (statistical) discrimination.
6 Due to the lack of “old boys’ networks” or 
“gatekeepers to high positions” in chess (Chabris and Glickman, 2006), this will allow us to 
elucidate some genuine gender differences on risk decision-making.
7  
3. Theoretical framework 
To obtain our measure of risk behavior we exploit the fact that chess players start each 
game by choosing a strategic development scheme for their pieces (called a chess opening). 
By exploiting a standardized classification of these openings, we can label the chosen 
strategies in each game as being either risky (aggressive) or safe (solid). 
                                                 
6 The prevalence of diverse incentives to invest in human capital following from different 
prospects of signaling skill and expertise in a statistical discrimination framework has been 
addressed in numerous studies; see Bjerk (2008) and references given there. 
7 Chabris and Glickman (2006), similar as Bilalić et al. (2009), refute the assertion made by 
Howard (2005) who reads the lack of top-level female chess players as evidence for gender 
differences in intellectual capacity. 
  7We use aggressiveness and solidity as our key concepts, meaning that a solid player is 
considered a risk-averse person, and an aggressive player is a risk-loving person. An 
aggressive playing tactic always involves a higher level of risk, as launching an attack on one 
part of the board implies that you neglect another. Typically, in such positions every move 
tends to be of utmost importance. Solid play avoids many possible weaknesses but at the cost 
of fewer attacking possibilities. Usually, one slip in a solid position will not lose the game.  
A chess game is divided into three parts, the opening, the middlegame and the endgame. 
The opening moves are “theoretical” and are memorized before the game, and, since no 
calculation is needed, these moves are played quickly. The opening theory covers most 
reasonable moves by the opponent and usually includes somewhere between ten and twenty 
moves in depth for each variation.  
In the opening, a player opts to have an answer to every reasonable move by the 
opponent. This very quickly becomes a great deal of theory to memorize, and to cut down on 
the theoretical preparation, a chess player limits his/her opening variation to include as few 
openings as possible (some deliberate variation is maintained to reduce predictability). A 
player’s set of openings is called an opening repertoire (OR). Considerable effort is dedicated 
to creating an opening repertoire that matches one’s personality. A player with temperament 
will typically choose more aggressive openings, while a calm, “peaceful” person will more 
often choose a solid opening. Since opening preparation requires a lot of hard work, the main 
body of the opening repertoire is kept for a long time, usually for years. As a player develops, 
the opening repertoire will undergo changes, but the basis usually remains the same.   
In a game theoretical framework chess is a sequential game where the players make 
moves in turn, as shown in the following game tree. We show one opening to exemplify the 
grounds on which it can be regarded as aggressive or solid. 
 
  8  3.e5 
aggressive 
2…d5 
neutral   
2.d4 
neutral  






After the first move for each side (1.e4 and 1...e6/1…c5), it is too early to classify the 
opening as being solid or aggressive.
 8 In the second and third moves, however, it is often 
possible to choose a move that leads to an aggressive or solid position, respectively. In the 
first end-node of the game tree, white grabs space with 3.e5, which will be used for an attack 
later on. In the second end-node, 3.exd5, white chooses a symmetric position without space 
advantage but avoiding weaknesses. In the third end-node, 2.c3, white chooses a more quiet 
system, but in the fourth, 2.d4, a pawn is sacrificed to assure initiative and attack. 
There are thousands of books on opening theory, recommending openings for different 
styles, so there is a great deal of knowledge about the strategic nature of the openings among 
chess players. A classification of openings, called Eco codes, with 500 opening categories  
has been in use for the last fifty years. We have consulted eight chess experts of different 
strengths with Elo rates ranging from 2000 to 2600, five men and three women, and have 
                                                 
8 To ease notation, the game tree only shows the possible strategies from the perspective of 
the player of the white pieces. Also, for the sake of simplicity, only pawn moves are discussed 
here. The annotation “1…e6” should be understood as: “the first move (1.) for black (…) and 
a pawn is moved to the coordinate e6.” In “exd5” x reads as “takes on.” 
1.e4 
neutral  
     1…c5 







  9asked them to give their opinion on the character of all the Eco codes.
9 In more detail, they 
were instructed to define each opening as either aggressive or solid. We then compare the 
opinions of the experts and declare an Eco code to be solid [aggressive] if at least six out of 
eight experts define it as solid [aggressive].
10 In cases when there are five or fewer votes for 
either solid or aggressive, the opening is considered to be unclear. About 1 percent of the 
games lack Eco codes and are excluded from the estimations; i.e. they enter into the category 
“A00,” which has become a residual of non-classified openings.     
As a result of our experts’ assessments, there are two labels for each game, one for the 
player of the white pieces and one for the black. This means that white can open solidly while 
black chooses a more aggressive approach. In such a case the label is “S” for white and “A” 
                                                 
9 According to the International Chess Federation (FIDE), a player is regarded as an expert if 
he/she has an Elo rating of 2000 or more. The lowest level required to obtain a Master title is 
a rating of 2300. A Grandmaster title usually implies an Elo rating of over 2500. In the year 
1999 Garry Kasparov reached an Elo rating of 2851, the highest Elo rating ever measured. 
10  See the Appendix for the instructions given to the experts and an extract from the 
questionnaires they filled out. The time each expert spent on the classifications varied 
between two and five hours. Each expert was unaware of the opinions of the other experts. In 
an earlier version of this paper we used the expertise of just four of our experts, two men and 
two women. The classification on openings differs slightly, but overall this does not affect the 
outcomes very much; see Gerdes and Gränsmark (2009) on estimation results based on the 
previous classification. To test the reliability of our procedure, we also tested a “five out of 
eight experts” requirement rule. Overall the outcomes are similar; however, in some 
estimations the results become more distinct. Nevertheless, we stick to the “six of eight 
experts” requirement rule, among others to guarantee that at least one woman is part of the 
decisive majority. 
  10for black. Consequently, there are four different possibilities for each Eco code: “AA”, “AS”, 
“SA” and “SS.” See the Appendix for descriptives on the classification of openings.  
3.1. Econometric model 
In the estimations each game in our data is treated as one observation. We start by 
showing results on gender differences as regards the probability of choosing a solid 
[aggressive] opening strategy or not. In general, estimations with a binary dependent variable 
can be done in various ways. To facilitate interpretation, we have chosen to focus on OLS 
estimations in a “linear probability model” (LPM) framework.  The equation we estimate 
looks as follows: 
yij = ij + xij+ wij + eij        (1) 
where y is the dependent variable of playing solid [aggressive] and x is a gender dummy 
which takes on the value one if the player observed (index i) in a game (index j) is a woman, 
zero if a man, w is a vector of control variables (discussed below), while e denotes the 
standard error. The coefficient  states the difference across gender as to the propensity to 
choose a solid [aggressive] strategy. A  positive [negative]  would point at women being 
more risk-averse than men, and vice versa.  
Our set of control variables is motivated by the following aspects. The share of female 
chess players has been growing in later years. Since most new chess players appearing in the 
top ranks of international chess are fairly young, it follows that women are on average 
younger than men. Also, women may to a certain extent drop out when they reach child-
rearing age. For this reason it is important to include control variables for age to pick up such 
  11patterns.
11 A control for Elo ratings is used to hold constant for systematic differences in 
chess skills across gender. We also include a control for the number of games recorded for a 
player in a given year, which is meant to account for the strength in the signal of risk 
preferences.
12  
Subsequent estimations aim at examining the importance of the gender of the opponent 
for the decision on what strategy to choose. There we include additional controls: individual 
fixed-effects, the strategy chosen by the opponent, as well as the Elo points that can be won or 
lost in a game. These estimations are made separately for male and female players. In those 
estimations the variable of interest is thus defined as playing against a female player. 
4. Data and statistics 
The data in this study were taken from ChessBase 10, a commercial database collection 
with 3.8 million chess games played in international chess events. It contains about 200,000 
players from all over the world. The data are organized in two dimensions, player-specific 
information and game-specific information. The name, year of birth, nationality and gender of 
a player are available. For every game there is data on the names and current Elo ratings of 
both players, the year a game was played, number of moves, Eco codes and the score, i.e. if a 
game was won, lost or ended in a draw. Before the beginning of the 1990s, such information 
                                                 
11 Besides linear and quadratic age variables, we include a dummy for “age 0-20” to allow for 
different intercepts and to account for the fact that teenagers are often considered to be more 
aggressive and impatient due to high levels of sex and growth hormones, see Kimura (1996).  
12   Organizers of chess events report the results (including a complete move sheet) 
immediately after the event. Information on chess players’ records are updated several times a 
year. Before a game, a player is informed about the name and playing strength of the 
opponent and can easily look up his or her playing history via the Internet.  
  12was coded by hand. With the arrival of digital storage facilities, data processing became the 
standard procedure, leading to a substantial increase in the number of games reported. Since 
1997 the registration of players and games played has become smoother across events and 
countries and for this reason we have limited our study to include games played from 1997 to 
2007. To assure a certain level of chess expertise we only include players with a minimum 
Elo rating of 2000. A player at this level is considered to be a chess expert and we assume that 
he/she has established his/her opening repertoire.
13 After imposing these restrictions, our 
sample includes ca 15 thousand players and 1.4 million games. 
Mean values are shown in Table 1. Regarding the information on a player’s nationality, 
we have grouped the countries in regions based on geographical lines and chess popularity. 
The regions with the highest number of chess players are Western Europe, Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union. These three regions account for about 90 percent of the expert 
chess players in the world. Western Europe alone accounts for 45 percent, Eastern Europe for 
27 percent and the former Soviet Union for about 18 percent, see panel A. Latin America, 
North America, Africa and Asia account for about 10 percent. Women have about a hundred 
points lower Elo rating points than men when averaged over the whole sample. The female 
share varies considerably across regions, as can be seen in panel B, from just over 5 percent in 
Western Europe, to 10 percent in Eastern Europe, and to 15 percent in the former Soviet 
Union.   
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                 
13 To be more exact, we require that at least one of the two players in each game fulfills the 
lower bound of 2000 in Elo. Furthermore, only players that have a record of at least twenty 
games between 1997 and 2007 are included in our sample, this to assure variation in the 
choice of a player’s strategy. 
  13The female share among top players has been rising constantly in the last two decades; 
consequently women are on average younger than male chess players. The average male 
player is 34 years old while the average female player is 25. In the former Soviet Union the 
mean age is much lower and the difference between the sexes is not as great as in Western 
Europe.
14 The female share decreases as we move up the Elo ladder, as can be seen in Figure 
1 in the next section. At Elo rate 2000, the female share is 17 percent, while at the very top 
(Elo 2600-2851) the female share is only about 1 percent.  
It should be pointed out that the number of internationally registered chess players 
differs considerably across regions. It is also likely that some less-developed countries only 
register higher-rated players, which might explain why countries with relatively few 
registered players have a rather high Elo average. The chess rating system in the USA is 
somewhat different from the definition applied by the International Chess Federation (FIDE). 
The data in ChessBase 10 are based on the definition made by FIDE and, consequently, only a 
few US players are included in the dataset.     
5. Estimation results 
In Table 2, the results from the OLS estimations are shown. As can be seen from 
column (1), the female dummy coefficient is .0204, implying that the marginal probability for 
women to choose a solid opening strategy is about 2 percentage points greater than for men, 
holding constant for age, Elo rating, number of games played and regional dummies. The 
estimate is significant on a one-percent level, which implies that there is strong statistical 
support for the claim that female players prefer opening strategies that are considered more 
risk-averse than their male counterparts. In column (2) we show the outcome of regression 
estimations where we use our measure of aggressive OR as dependent variable. The solid and 
                                                 
14 Information on gender differences across regions is available on request. 
  14the aggressive OR are close but not perfect reflections of each other, as some openings have 
been left uncategorized (i.e. they did not fulfill the “at least six out of eight experts” 
requirement).
15 The female dummy coefficient is both negative and significant, which is 
consistent with the positive results found for solid OR as a dependent variable.
16 The 
marginal effect is estimated at -.0197, i.e. women have a 2 percentage point lower probability 
of choosing an aggressive opening than male players, after controlling for other covariates. 
                                                
 
 Table 2 about here 
In order to understand how the female coefficient is affected at different levels of 
playing strength, we also run separate regressions for eleven intervals with a range of 50 Elo 
points each. The female dummy coefficients for the solid OR are positive over all intervals 
(except one), see Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
As we turn to aggressive OR in Figure 2, it reveals a mirror image of Figure 1. The 
results appear to be even stronger as the female coefficients are consistently below zero and 
the standard errors notably smaller. It is worth pointing out that the consistently negative 
coefficient estimates are paralleled by a substantial decrease in the share of females. This 
means that differences with respect to taste for risk are more or less stable, irrespective of the 
actual level of skill of the players or the female share within each interval. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
15 As can be seen in Table 1, about 47 percent of the played openings are considered to be 
solid, 20 percent aggressive according to their classification. 
16 We also run probit estimations; the results are similar to the OLS estimates. 
  155.1. Impact of mixed-sex competition 
As a result of the detailed information given in our data set it is also possible to take 
into account certain characteristics of the opponent in each game played. This allows us to 
look at gender-affected strategies, i.e. the issue of whether the choice of strategy depends on 
the sex of the opponent or not. In Table 3 we show the results from regression estimations that 
aim to test whether male players change their strategy when facing a female opponent. 
Correspondingly, in Table 4 we present the results from the perspective of a female player.  
For male players the probability of choosing a solid strategy is about 1.3 percent lower 
when facing a female opponent compared to a male opponent, see column (1) in Table 3. In 
other words, men on average abstain more often from using solid strategies when playing 
against women. Apart from our standard set of control variables, three additional controls are 
included consecutively: individual fixed effects, the opponent plays a solid strategy and Elo 
points at stake. The first set of control variables is intended to hold constant for all kinds of 
time-persistent characteristics of players. The second addresses the fact that women choose 
solid openings to a greater extent (as we saw previously), which might per se trigger a player 
to respond by playing a (non-)solid strategy. The third control variable picks up the marginal 
amount of Elo points a player can gain by winning that game. It is based on accounts of the 
difference in Elo ratings between both players.
17 As one can see in columns (2) and (3), these 
additional controls do not change the fact that men, when playing against women, are less 
inclined to play solid. We also compare the choice of strategy of players when they face an 
opponent with a lower or higher Elo rating respectively, see columns (4) and (5). The estimate 
in column (5) shows a slight indication that also weaker players, in terms of their Elo rating, 
are more likely to refrain from using solid openings when they play against women. 
 
                                                 
17 See the Appendix for information on how this variable is constructed. 
  16Table 3 about here 
The pattern for female players is quite different; see Table 4. The coefficients are much 
smaller and overall insignificant. Our interpretation of this is that women are not affected by 
the sex of their opponent when it comes to choosing whether to play a solid strategy or not.  
 
Table 4 about here 
Looking at aggressive OR instead of solid OR as the outcome variable leads to similar 
outcomes, at least as regards male players. The coefficient estimates point at men choosing 
more aggressive strategies when facing a female opponent, see Table 5. Interestingly, the 
estimate in column (5) shows that in cases where men are on objective grounds weaker 
players than their female opponents, their propensity to opt for an aggressive opening strategy 
seems to become even greater.
18  
 
Table 5 about here 
Turning to female players shown in Table 6, we see a clear difference as regards 
aggressive OR compared to the estimated relations in estimations looking at solid OR in 
Table 4. When women are playing against female players, they show a greater inclination to 
use an aggressive strategy compared to when playing against a man, see column (3). Looking 
at columns (4) and (5) it becomes evident that the effect is driven by the outcomes from a 
setting where women meet female opponents with higher Elo ratings than themselves.  
                                                 
18 The difference in coefficient estimates in columns (4) and (5) is not significant. However, 
when we use a classification of openings applying a “five of eight experts” requirement, the 
coefficient estimates indicate a significantly greater propensity to use aggressive opening 
strategies against females if a man is a weaker player. 
  17The results highlight the marginal importance of single-sex vs. mixed-sex competition 
as regards the choice of (aggressive) strategy. In particular, on the margin both men and 
women condition their choice on the sex of their opponent. Our findings are to some extent 
consistent with those reported in Maass et al. (2008). Their results show that female players 




Table 6 about here 
5.2. Rational, yes or no? 
Why do male chess players choose to refrain from playing a solid game and opt for 
more aggressive strategies when they play against female opponents? Could it be rational to 
pursue a more aggressive strategy? In an attempt to find an answer, we investigate whether 
men have a greater winning probability when they use such a strategy in games where they 
face a female opponent. For a strategy to be seen as rational, we simply require that it should 
result in a higher probability of winning a game. For analytical clarity, it is desirable to use an 
unambiguous outcome measure, so here we only consider wins and losses, not draws. The 
results of estimations are shown in Table 7 where the outcome of the game (a win is coded as 
1, a loss as 0) has been regressed on choosing a solid strategy, holding constant for other 
aspects, similar to the earlier regressions. We find that when a man plays against a woman, a 
solid strategy has a 1.5 percentage point higher probability of winning compared to not using 
                                                 
19 In Maass et al. (2008) top-level chess players were asked to compete against each other via 
a computer platform, so no participant had any personal contact with his/her opponent. They 
argue that their findings can be explained by gender stereotyping that would depress women’s 
self-confidence. 
  18such strategy.
20 Our interpretation of these results is that, on average, it does appear irrational 
for males to opt for less solid strategies when they face a female opponent.  
 
Table 7 about here 
5.3. Discussion of results 
We have looked at different outcomes aimed at measuring strategic behavior. We have 
found that women choose more cautious strategies than men, which we interpret as women 
being more risk-averse on average. As this study provides a new way of studying risk 
behavior, it is not obvious how to relate the size of the measured effects to other findings in 
the literature. At first sight, the estimates may not seem very great. However, this does not 
mean that the effects are negligible. Remember that the estimates state the average gender 
differences for one game; the number of games played in FIDE approved tournaments and 
other events over a one-year period is about 34 for men and 33 for women, see Table 1. This 
implies that the impact of differences in the choice of strategies on a player’s prospect of 
advancing in his/her career might cumulate over time.
21 In addition, the measured effect is 
                                                 
20  Looking at the outcome of playing aggressive OR for the propensity to win against a 
female opponent generates consistent results, i.e. lower winning probabilities. For women the 
results are comparable, i.e. less solid/more aggressive play against a female opponent results 
in a lower propensity to win against a female opponent. Estimates are more distinct for 
women, i.e. both greater and overall significantly different from zero. Results are available on 
request from the authors. 
21 See Eagly (1995) for a discussion on the (difficult) issue of interpreting the real impact of 
measured statistics in the context of behavioral research, especially as regards gender 
differences. 
  19important because it turns out to be pervasive, i.e. it even holds when we restrict estimations 
to comprise the world’s best-performing chess players, as can be seen in Figure 2.
22    
A rather novel result in this study regards the fact that men choose to refrain from using 
solid strategies, as well as becoming more prone to using aggressive strategies, when facing a 
female opponent. In some models estimated, women too behave more aggressively against 
their female peers by choosing a more aggressive strategy.
23 It is striking that both men and 
women seem more inclined to choose a risky strategy when facing a female opponent on 
occasions when the opponent is superior by means of their respective Elo ratings. We are not 
in a position to provide a conclusive explanation for the latter result; however, some theories 
on stereotyping within the social psychological literature fit in nicely with our results. 
According to these studies “judgment can become more stereotypic under cognitive load,” 
(Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000, p. 105). Under the assumption that the “cognitive load” 
becomes greater when playing against a stronger player, gender stereotyping could be used as 
a “cognitive shortcut,” i.e. used as a means of processing information in a heuristic mode. As 
Hilton and von Hippel (1996) report, stereotyping can manifest itself through the selective 
judgment of evidence, for example regarding another person’s intelligence. Thus, 
stereotyping seems to be a plausible explanation for our findings, especially as we find the 
elevated aggressiveness against women not to be rewarding, i.e. irrational in economic terms.  
                                                 
22 The latter result is in contrast to studies referred to in Croson and Gneezy (2009), saying 
that gender differences among managers and entrepreneurs in risk taking attenuate with 
experience and profession. 
23 This is in line with the findings by Holm (1996) who showed that both men and women 
behaved more aggressively against women. 
  206. Concluding comments  
In our introduction we sought to establish a link between the strategic thinking of highly 
skilled chess players on the one hand, and the chances of successfully climbing the career 
ladder on the other. There are innumerous situations where men and women compete, for 
example in a negotiating situation, which might be characterized as a “two-person 
competition,” as noted by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). They show that compared to men 
women avoid competitive schemes, and when forced to compete, they fail to do so 
appropriately. Basically, our results are consistent with theirs; however, we add a new facet 
by showing that men become more inclined to choose aggressive strategies when they face a 
female opponent. One might read this result in terms of overconfidence. Some studies point at 
men being more overconfident than women, especially in “male-dominated realms” such as 
trading, see Barber and Odean (2001). Based on our results, male overconfidence might 
become even stronger when men face a female opponent. Alternatively one might read the 
results in terms of gender stereotyping, leading to the undervaluation of the real capacity of 
women in cognitive demanding situations. The latter aspect might also explain why women 
too are more prone to choosing aggressive (i.e. risky) strategies when playing against female 
opponents who on objective grounds are stronger players. 
One objection that might be raised against this study is that it focuses on a 
nonrepresentative selection of people, i.e. a group more accustomed to complex strategic 
thinking than people in general. Also, as the female share among chess players is low it is 
possible that the motivation that drives women to playing chess is different from the 
motivation that drives men. Both aspects suggest that one should be careful not to generalize 
the results too far. On the other hand, by using a large panel data set, we are in a position to 
control for individual heterogeneity by means of including individual fixed-effects. In 
combination with the Elo rating, which permits controlling for differences in skills (i.e. 
  21productivity), this study adds a new dimension to the existing research on risk behavior. 
Furthermore, as our sample of chess players comprises people from (almost) all over the 
world, the behavioral patterns found are not tied to a specific cultural, religious or social 
environment. Rather, they reflect expressions of human interaction that people share 
irrespective of heritage.   
The fact that we can observe mixed-group behavior in a competitive environment is a 
main contribution of the paper. It thereby emphasizes the importance of interpersonally 
determined mechanisms occurring in highly competitive situations. In particular, our results 
shed a new light on the discussion on what determines differences between men and women 
in intellectually demanding professions. We believe that different outcomes across gender are 
not merely a question of deliberate discrimination on the part of men, but are at least to some 
extent due to deep-rooted mechanisms that surface in situations where competitors of the 
opposite sex meet. Naturally, our results should be tested and validated in other settings. If 
they stand up to comprehensive examination, they will certainly become important for 
designing policy measures aimed at counteracting the disadvantaged position of women in 
different parts of society. 
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Appendix 
Expert enquiry: Instructions to the chess experts  
For every Eco code you must decide whether the opening is to be considered as aggressive, 
solid, or unclear. Denote your definitions using A, S or 0 respectively. This should be done 
from the perspectives of both players (white and black). As most Eco codes contain sub-
openings where some can be aggressive and others solid within the same Eco code, you 
should focus on what you believe is the principal opening and that is played most frequently. 
The key moves are those where the players must decide on the character of the game, i.e. “am 
I to choose the safe path or the risky path?”.  It is your feeling or belief about the opening 
that is important, not “the philosophical truth” from a theoretical perspective that is still to 
be discovered. Try to use the same information as you would when you choose what openings 




Classification of standard opening by expert chess players  
Extract from the questionnaire 
  26Eco  Opening  Variation  Player  w1 b1 w2 b2  w3 b3 w4 b4 
     White  Black          
B01 Center  Counter    S S  e 4   d 5         
B02 Alekhine’s  Defence    S A  e 4   N f 6         
B03 Alekhine’s  Defence    A A  e4  Nf6  e5  Nd5 d4     
B04  Alekhine’s Defence  Classical Variation  S A  e4 Nf6  e5 Nd5 d4 d6 Nf3   
B05  Alekhine’s Defence  Classical Variation  S A  e4 Nf6  e5 Nd5 d4 d6 Nf3  Bg4
B06 Modern  Defence    S A  e 4   g 6         
B07 Pirc  Defence    S A  e4  d6  d4  Nf6      
B08  Pirc Defence  Classical Variation  S A  e4 d6 d4 Nf6  Nc3  g6 Nf3   
B09  Pirc Defence  Austrian Attack  A A  e4 d6 d4 Nf6  Nc3  g6 f4  
B10 Caro-Kann  Defence    S S  e4  c6        
Note: w1: first move white; b2: second move black; etc. e4, d5, etc. denoting chessboard coordinates, while N and B denote 
knight and bishop, respectively. 
 
Summary statistics on the classification of openings are shown in Table A.2. For example, an 
opening on the part of a white player is considered solid in 50% of all the 499 openings 
classified. 
Table A.2 
  Obs Mean values Standard deviations
Solid OR, playing White  499 .501 (.501)
Solid OR, playing Black  499 .405 (.491)
Aggressive OR, playing White  499 .251 (.434)
Aggressive OR, playing Black  499 .297 (.457)
 
The Elo Rating System 
The following section is to some extent drawn from “Arpad Elo and the Elo Rating System” 
by Daniel Ross. http://www.chessbase.com/newsdetail.asp?newsid=4326  
The description aims to show how winning probabilities are calculated and how Elo rates of 
chess players are subsequently updated. 
  27In the late 1950s, Arpad Elo, physicist and himself a devoted chess player, introduced a new 
system of classifying the strength of chess players. By observing results from chess 
tournaments, he noted that the distribution of individual performances in chess resembled a 
normal distribution. On the basis of his observations, he introduced a point scale, where he 
determined the standard deviation to be 200. The distribution relates to the difference in 
ability between two players. Defining μ as the difference in Elo strength between two players, 














 e x f      ( 1 )  
As there are two participants, each of them having an assumed performance deviation of 200 
Elo points, the standard deviation used in (1) can be rewritten as follows: 




1               (2) 
The cumulative distribution function of the pdf in (1) provides the expected probability of 
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Figure A.1 about here 
The two horizontal lines identify the probability of winning when the difference in Elo is 0 
and 200, respectively. Consequently, the probability is 76 [24] percent if one player has 200 
Elo points more [less] than his/her opponent. Where two players are equally strong (i.e. an 
Elo difference equal to zero), the most likely outcome is a draw. 
  28Elo ratings: A sequential estimate of strength 
The probability of winning as shown in equation (3) is used to update a player’s Elo rating. 
The algorithm for doing this reads as follows:    
Elo_new = Elo_old + (Score-Prob(winning))*k   (4) 
Here Elo_old is the Elo rating before the game starts, while Elo_new is the updated rating. 
The Score indicates the actual outcome of a game, where a win [loss] is valued as 1 [0], and a 
draw counts as .5 point. The coefficient k is a weighting factor that determines how much the 
outcome of a game counts for a player’s Elo rating. It is determined by the number of games 
played, i.e. the less experienced a player is, the higher the k.  
 
In some of our estimations a variable denoted “Elo points at stake” is included as a covariate. 
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  29TABLE 1 
Mean values at game level 
Panel A. 
 All  Men  Women 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Solid OR  .471  (.499)  .472  (.499)  .462  (.499) 
Aggressive OR  .203  (.402)  .202  (.402)  .206  (.404) 
Elo score  2339.230  (167.427)  2348.023 (167.103)  2242.834  (138.137) 
Age 32.809  (13.499)  33.532  (13.565)  24.887  (9.701) 
Aged max 20 in %  .212  (.409)  .192  (.393)  .435  (.496) 
Number of games 
played per year   33.959  (29.624)  34.017  (30.135)  33.314  (23.288) 
            
North America  .027  (.162)  .028  (.164)  .018  (.133) 
Latin America  .036  (.187)  .038  (.191)  .020  (.141) 
Nordic countries  .048  (.213)  .050  (.218)  .025  (.155) 
Western Europe*  .398  (.489)  .412  (.492)  .241  (.428) 
Eastern Europe  .271  (.445)  .266  (.442)  .323  (.468) 
fr Soviet Union  .175  (.380)  .163  (.370)  .305  (.460) 
N Africa /Mid Eat  .011  (.104)  .011  (.103)  .012  (.110) 
East Asia  .027  (.162)  .024  (.154)  .055  (.227) 
Africa .001  (.023)  .001  (.023)  .001  (.029) 
            
Panel B. 

















Elo  score  2389.3 2364.5 2322.6 2291.6 2338.9 2433.0  2365.3  2373.9 
fem  share  .056 .046 .043 .051 .100 .146  .094  .170 
Age    34.1 32.6 32.9 34.8 32.7 29.6  27.5  26.2 
Note: All mean values calculated on figures according to the period 1997 to 2007. * Net of Nordic countries. 
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TABLE 2 
OLS estimations regarding gender differences in playing opening strategies.  
    Dependent variable: 




.0001 -.0001  Elo 
  (.0000)*** (.0000)*** 
.0204 -.0197  Female 
  (.0075)*** (.0054)*** 
.0042 -.0036  Age 
  (.0007)*** (.0005)*** 
-.0000 .0000  age squared 
  (.0000)*** (.0000)*** 
-.0062 .0047  Age max 20 
  (.0053) (.0040) 




Observations  1 399 284  1 399 284 
Number of players  15 122  15 122 
Note: Nationality controls are: North America. Latin America. Nordic countries. East 
Europe. the former Soviet Union. North Africa/Middle-East. East Asia. Africa with 
Western Europe as comparison. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 
player level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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TABLE 3 
OLS estimations regarding the impact of playing against a woman on the choice of opening. 
MEN. 
Dependent variable: Choosing solid opening strategies, yes or no 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
















No Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Indicator opponent 
playing Solid  
No No Yes Yes  Yes 
Including measure 
Elo points at stake 
 
No No Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  1 282 315  1 282 315  1 282 315  678 652  599 418 
Number of players  13 985  13 985  13 985  13 755  13 978 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables 
are Elo. age. age squared. Age_max_20. Log (number of games played).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 4 
OLS estimations regarding the impact of playing against a woman on the choice of opening. 
WOMEN. 
Dependent variable: Choosing solid opening strategies, yes or no 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
















Individual fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Indicator opponent 
playing Solid  
No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake 
 
No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  116 969  116 969  116 969  53 864  62 768 
Number of players  1 137  1 137  1 137  1 087  1 137 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are 
Elo. age. age squared. Age_max_20. Log (number of games played).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  33 
TABLE 5 
OLS estimations regarding the impact of playing against a woman on the choice of opening. 
MEN. 
Dependent variable: Choosing aggressive opening strategies, yes or no 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 




Female  opponent  .0013  .0068 .0077 .0069  .0080 
 (.0028)  (.0020)*** (.0020)*** (.0024)***  (.0036)**
Individual fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Indicator opponent 
playing Aggressive  
No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake 
 
No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1 282 315  1 282 315  1 282 315  678 652  599 418 
Number of players  13 985  13 985  13 985  13 755  13 978 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are 
Elo. age. age squared. Age_max_20. Log (number of games played).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 6 
OLS estimations regarding the impact of playing against a woman on the choice of opening. 
WOMEN. 
Dependent variable: Choosing aggressive opening strategies, yes or no 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




Female opponent  .0024  .0031  .0052  .0004  .0099 
 (.0037)  (.0025)  (.0024)**  (.0036)  (.0036)*** 
Individual fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Indicator opponent 
playing Aggressive  
No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake 
 
No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  116 969  116 969  116 969  53 864  62 768 
Number of players  1 137  1 137  1 137  1 087  1 137 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are 
Elo. age. age squared. Age_max_20. Log (number of games played).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 7 
OLS estimations regarding the probability of winning a game when playing against a woman 
and using a solid strategy. MEN. 
Dependent variable: Bivariate outcome of winning (1) or losing (0) a game 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




Solid strategy  .0140  .0129  .0156  .0234  .0182 
 (.0053)***  (.0073)*  (.0069)**  (.0085)***  (.0149) 
Individual fixed 
effects 
No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Indicator opponent 
playing Solid  
No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Observations  34 011  34 011  34 011  22 515  11 423 
Number of players  8 818  8 818  8 818  6 717  4 722 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are 
Elo. age. age squared. Age_max_20. Log (number of games played).  
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Fig.1. Coefficient for women dummy for Solid as dependent variable. Upper and lower bound 
indicating 95% confidence interval. 
 
Notes: Results from regression estimations using a window of 50 Elo rating points, e.g. 2200+/-25. 
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Fig.2. Coefficient for women dummy for Aggressive as dependent variable. Upper and lower 
bound indicating 95% confidence interval. 
 
Notes: Results from regression estimations using a window of 50 Elo rating points, e.g. 2200+/-25. 
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Fig.A.1. Cumulative probability of winning a chess game based on differences in Elo rating 
points between two players. 
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